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Preserving global public goods, such as the planet’s ecosystem, depends on large-
scale cooperation, which is difficult to achieve because the standard reciprocity 
mechanisms weaken in large groups. Here we demonstrate a method by which 
reciprocity can maintain cooperation in a large-scale public goods game (PGG). In a 
first experiment, participants in groups of on average 39 people play one round of a 
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with their two nearest neighbours on a cyclic network 
after each PGG round. We observe that people engage in “local-to-global” 
reciprocity, leveraging local interactions to enforce global cooperation: Participants 
reduce PD cooperation with neighbours who contribute little in the PGG. In 
response, low PGG contributors increase their contributions if both neighbours 
defect in the PD. In a control condition, participants do not know their neighbours' 
PGG contribution and thus cannot link play in the PD to the PGG. In the control we 
observe a sharp decline of cooperation in the PGG, while in the treatment condition 
global cooperation is maintained. In a second experiment, we demonstrate the 
scalability of this effect: in a 1,000-person PGG, participants in the treatment 
condition successfully sustain public contributions. Our findings suggest that this 
simple “local-to-global” intervention facilitates large-scale cooperation. 
 
Keywords: cooperation; large-scale public goods; local-to-global reciprocity; 
observability 
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Large-scale cooperation is essential to solving many of today’s global problems, such as 
preserving the rainforest or combating climate change1. However, cooperation in the 
groups is challenging to achieve, because cooperating means to pay a cost to benefit the 
group as a whole. Thus, everyone in the group is individually better off not contributing, 
and the “tragedy of the commons” ensues2,3. To address this collective failure of 
cooperation, mechanisms have been proposed to promote cooperation in pairwise games 
or small groups3-5. Much less is known, however, about how to maintain cooperation in 
large groups (which are by definition harder to study in the laboratory). Here we 
demonstrate a mechanism that can sustain large-scale cooperation. 
 
Experiments focusing on interactions between pairs of people or within small groups 
(typically, consisting of 3 to 5 people), have established the power of reciprocity for 
promoting cooperation, be it in the form of repetition6,7, reputation8-12, shaming13,14, 
network effects15-17, threat of expulsion18, or costly sanctions10,19-23. The power of 
reciprocity, however, has been argued to diminish as group size increases, and therefore it 
seems that these reciprocity-based mechanisms are insufficient for promoting cooperation 
on a global scale24. Although pairs of individuals interacting repeatedly will typically 
learn to cooperate6, even very small groups interacting repeatedly almost always 
converge on defection25. 
 
The reason is that targeted reciprocity is impossible in group interactions: if you stop 
cooperating towards the group, this harms defectors in your group but also cooperators. 
The problem can be addressed by adding the opportunity for group members to punish or 
reward each other based on their contributions11,26. Such pairwise interactions allow 
people to target their reciprocity and can stabilise cooperation in small groups. For 
example, stable cooperation has been observed in studies examining groups of 3 or 4 
people in which pairwise interactions occur between all group members19-21; and in 
groups of up to 10 people, so long as group members can sanction at least half of the 
other group members27.  
 
But what about larger groups? Targeted pairwise interactions between most or all group 
members cannot scale effectively as groups become larger. With increasing group size, it 
becomes unlikely that a particular group member has the opportunity to interact with any 
given other member of the group28. Thus the settings in which previous experiments have 
found cooperation to be sustainable, in which group members interact in pairs with a 
large fraction of other members of the group, is untenable when groups are large.  
 
Does this reasoning imply that reciprocity cannot maintain cooperation in large groups? 
Here we show that the answer is “no.” We demonstrate that coupling a large repeated 
group cooperative dilemma to a sparse network of repeated pairwise reciprocal 
interactions averts the “tragedy of the commons,” and sustains cooperation in groups an 
order of magnitude larger than those studied previously. The number of pairwise 
interactions need not scale with the size of the group: a handful of repeated local 
interactions can support cooperation on a global scale. 
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Methods 
 
To assess the power of such “local-to-global” reciprocity, we developed a novel online 
software platform called SoPHIE (Software Platform for Human Interaction Experiments, 
freely available and fully customisable at www.sophielabs.net) to facilitate simultaneous 
interaction of large numbers of participants29. We then used this software to conduct 
large-scale economic game experiments.  
 
In our first experiment, group sizes were on average 39 people (min = 17, max = 60, sd = 
10.28; total N = 646), an order of magnitude larger than typical laboratory experiments 
with 4 players per group20,21. After providing informed consent, participants played a 
repeated 2-stage economic game over 20 rounds. In each round of the game, participants 
first took part in a group contribution stage, and then a pairwise cooperation stage in 
which they chose actions towards two other group members; for details, see 
Supplementary Information (SI) Section 1; all experiments were approved by Harvard 
University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research and carried out in 
accordance with the relevant guidelines. 
 
In the group contribution stage, participants received an endowment of 20 Monetary 
Units (MUs), and played a public goods game (PGG) with all other members of the 
group. In this global interaction, players chose how many of these MUs to contribute to 
the public good, and how many to keep for themselves. All contributions were doubled 
and distributed equally among all group members. Thus contributing benefitted the group 
as a whole, but was individually costly.  
 
For the pairwise cooperation stage, participants were arranged on a ring-structured 
network in which they were connected to one neighbour on each side (Figure 1). 
Participants played a separate Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game with each of their two 
neighbours, who remained the same throughout the experiment. In each PD, participants 
could cooperate by paying 6 MUs to give the other person 18 MUs, or defect by doing 
nothing. Participants did not have to take the same action towards both neighbours.  
 
Our experiment had two conditions. In the control condition, local-to-global reciprocity 
was not possible: in the pairwise cooperation stage, participants were not informed about 
the group contribution behaviour of their neighbours (Figure 1c). Thus they could not use 
their pairwise relationships to enforce global cooperation, and we expected group 
contributions to decrease over time.  
 
In the treatment condition, conversely, participants were informed of their neighbours’ 
group contributions while making their pairwise cooperation decisions (Figure 1d). Thus 
local-to-global reciprocity was possible, and we expected that (i) subjects would 
preferentially cooperate in the pairwise stage with neighbours that had contributed larger 
amounts in the group stage; and (ii) as a result, we would observe stable high levels of 
group contribution (in contrast to the control).   
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In both conditions, participants were not informed about the total (or average) amount 
contributed to the PGG across all group members. This lack of PGG information models 
the fact that in global-level public goods, such as ecosystem conservation, one cannot 
observe the contribution behaviour of the vast majority of others. Thus, we typically have 
very little idea of the overall level of public good provisioning. 
 
Results 
 
To evaluate these predictions, we began by comparing contributions to the group across 
our two conditions (Figure 2a). Indeed, we observed significantly higher average 
contributions in the treatment compared to the control (coeff = 5.727, p < 0.001, Table 
S1, and Figure S1; all p-values generated using linear regression with robust standard 
errors clustered on session, see SI Section 2 for details). Furthermore, this difference in 
contribution emerged over time: while participants decreased their contributions from 
round to round in control (coeff = -0.345, p < 0.001), contributions in the treatment were 
stable (no significant decrease in contribution with round, coeff = -0.051, p = 0.098; 
difference between conditions is significant, as shown by the interaction between round 
and a dummy for the control treatment: coeff = -0.294, p < 0.001, Table S2). 
 
What explains the difference in contribution patterns between treatment and control? 
Participants’ pairwise cooperation behaviour provides an answer. While there was no 
significant difference in average levels of PD cooperation between conditions (Figure 2b; 
coeff = 0.031, p = 0.342, Table S3), the specific ways that PD cooperation was used did 
differ importantly (Figure 3a). In the control, participants were unable to condition their 
PD cooperation on their neighbours’ PGG contributions (since this information was not 
available). All they could do was cooperate more with a neighbour who cooperated with 
them in the previous round (coeff = 0.540, p < 0.001, Table S5).  
 
In the treatment, on the other hand, participants took advantage of the contribution 
information available to them to engage in local-to-global reciprocity. In addition to 
cooperating more with those who previously cooperated with them in the local PD (coeff 
= 0.475, p < 0.001, Table S5), participants were also more likely to cooperate with 
neighbours who had contributed at least as much as them in the global PGG (coeff = 
0.175, p < 0.001, Table S5). Moreover, a significant interaction occurred such that 
participants were most likely to cooperate with neighbours who cooperated in the PD and 
contributed at least as much as them in the PGG (coeff = 0.168, p = 0.002, Table S5). 
Participants in the treatment condition thus reciprocated not only their neighbour’s 
previous pairwise cooperation, but also their contributions in the group cooperation stage: 
they enacted local-to-global reciprocity. This created an incentive to contribute in the 
PGG that was absent from the control. 
 
There are two ways that this incentive might be used: did participants cooperate more 
with high contributors, or withhold cooperation from low contributors? To find out, we 
compared average cooperation rates in control to cooperation rates towards low versus 
high contributors in treatment (Figure 3a). If participants were increasing cooperation 
towards high contributors, we would expect cooperation rates towards high contributors 
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in the treatment to be higher than the baseline cooperation rate observed in the control. 
However, we found no such difference (coeff = 0.037, p = 0.303, Table S9). If, on the 
other hand, participants were withholding cooperation from low contributors, we would 
expect less cooperation towards low contributors in the treatment compared to the control 
baseline; and this is precisely what we observed (coeff = -0.201, p < 0.001, Table S8). 
Thus we found evidence that local-to-global reciprocity functioned in our experiment via 
participants withholding cooperation from low contributing neighbours. 
 
Finally, we investigated whether this withholding of cooperation from low contributors 
was effective in eliciting higher PGG contributions in the next round (Figure 3b). 
Interestingly, while receiving PD defection from only one neighbour had no effect on 
PGG contribution (using number of defecting neighbour as independent variable to 
predict change in contributions; 1 defecting neighbour: coeff = 0.069, p = 0.871), both 
neighbours defecting in the PD led to a significant increase in PGG contribution in the 
next round (2 defecting neighbours: coeff = 1.981, p = 0.001, for details see SI Section 
2.4). Thus, withholding cooperation was only effective when both neighbours 
coordinated their withholding.  
 
In addition to disciplining low contributors, PD cooperation also effectively buttressed 
high contributors against the temptation to reduce their contributions in treatment. High 
contributors who did not receive cooperation from either neighbour in the PD cooperation 
substantially reduced their PGG contribution on average. But the more PD cooperation 
high contributors received from their neighbours, the less this reduction in subsequent 
PGG contribution occurred (coeff = 0.828, p < 0.001, Table S12). Thus we see a full 
characterisation of the mechanism by which local cooperation stabilised global 
contribution. 
 
Importantly, these effects were unique to treatment: participant in the control condition 
did not change their contribution behaviour in response to amount of PD cooperation they 
received (low contributors: coeff = -0.048, p = 0.857, Table S10; high contributors: coeff 
= 0.253, p = 0.183, Table S12), and this differed significantly from what we observed in 
the treatment (interaction between number of cooperating neighbours and control 
dummy; low contributors: coeff = 1.105, p = 0.002, Table S10; high contributors: coeff = 
0.575, p = 0.015, Table S12). 
 
Finally, we present evidence that the power of local-to-global reciprocity is scalable. 
First, we take advantage of random variation across sessions in the number of participants 
in the PGG. One might worry that as groups become larger, local interactions with just 
two neighbours would become less effective at maintaining global cooperation. However, 
we find no evidence of this (Figure 4a): a threefold increase in the size of the group had 
no discernible impact on PGG contributions in the treatment (using group size of each 
session as independent variable to predict the average contribution in the final round of 
the game in treatment: coeff = -0.015, p = 0.782, Table S13). This lack of relationship 
suggests the scalability of our intervention, although the small number of independent 
observations (i.e., groups) prevents this finding from being definitive.  
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Therefore, we provide further evidence of scalability by conducting a second experiment 
with a much larger PGG group of 1000 people. Participants in the second experiment 
played a repeated two-stage economic game that identical to the first experiment, with 
two exceptions (beyond the larger group size). First, in the pairwise cooperation stage, 
participants played a PD with just one other member of the group (rather than two others, 
as in the first experiment). We reduced the number of PD partners to further assess the 
robustness of our “local-to-global” intervention. Second, we equalised the amount of 
information participants were given across conditions about the contributions of others: 
participants in both conditions were informed about the contribution behaviour of one 
other person each round (their PD partner in the treatment condition, and a random other 
player in the control condition), unlike in Study 1 where only participants in the treatment 
condition received information about the contributions of two other players. This change 
allows Study 2 to demonstrate that the findings of Study 1 were not the result of varying 
the information provided across conditions. For details on the experimental design of our 
second study, see SI Section 1. 
 
Despite the extremely large group size of our second experiment, we replicated our 
earlier results. Average contributions were significantly higher in treatment than in 
control (coeff = 1.456, p = 0.005, Table S15), and this difference emerged over time 
(interaction between control dummy and round number, coeff = -0.1092, p = 0.017, Table 
S15): while contributions in the treatment were stable (coeff = -0.027, p = 0.429), 
contributions in the control condition decreased with round (coeff = -0.136, p < 0.001). 
 
Discussion 
 
In summary, we have shown that “local-to-global” reciprocity can maintain stable 
contributions in a large public goods game. Participants withheld cooperation from other 
group members who contributed less than them. Low contributors, in turn, increased their 
contributions when their neighbours jointly withheld cooperation from them, while high 
contributors continued to contribute when their neighbours cooperated with them. Thus, 
stable levels of contributions emerged in the group cooperation stage of the treatment. In 
the control, conversely, such local-to-global reciprocity was not possible, and PGG 
contributions decreased over time.  
 
In his seminal 1968 paper, Garrett Hardin postulated that the “tragedy of the commons” 
in large populations cannot be solved like any other societal challenge2. Thus, Hardin’s 
summary, “The population has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension 
of morality,” has remained unchallenged. Here we propose the first technical solution to 
this problem.  
 
Across two experiments, we found that our intervention to sustain large-scale cooperation 
was not affected by the size of the group: “local-to-global” reciprocity lead contributions 
in treatment to be sustained in groups several magnitudes larger than previously studied. 
In particular, targeted reciprocity need not be scaled with the size of the network: instead 
participants only need to be informed of what a small number of other participants in the 
network who they interact with did previously, irrespective of the size of the group. The 
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fact that local-to-global reciprocity was effective in such large groups is especially 
surprising, given that the marginal per capita return of contributing in the PGG becomes 
smaller as groups grow and thus the incentives to contribute are reduced30-33. However, 
despite the lower incentives in larger groups, local-to-global reciprocity could maintain 
cooperation, suggesting that participants were not sensitive to their return from 
contributing but rather that they wanted to be seen as cooperators. Future research should 
also explore how similar mechanisms (or other incentives to cooperate34-36) could be 
leveraged to promote cooperation with future generations where there is no possibility of 
reciprocity and there are no any returns from contributing to the public good37,38. 
 
Our results may also seem surprising in light of prior findings that PGG contributions 
could not be sustained even in groups as small as 5 people if participants only had 
targeted interactions with one other group member27. However, these prior findings were 
generated in a setting where groups were randomly rematched each period specifically to 
prevent reciprocity effects. Thus we show that when reciprocity is possible, even a very 
sparse pairwise interaction network can sustain cooperation in very large groups.  
 
Some formal models have suggested that group size poses a challenge for reciprocity-
based mechanisms in sustaining cooperation and cannot readily explain the levels of 
cooperation observed in contemporary and ancient societies24. But these models did not 
consider the possibility of pairwise interactions that allow for targeted action (a 
possibility which ethnographic research has shown to be a key feature of human 
interactions in the field39). Theory suggests that adding such interactions can stabilise 
cooperation 11,26. And indeed, our experimental findings demonstrate that reciprocity can 
in fact maintain cooperation in large groups, if each individual has even a very small 
number of pairwise interactions. Further theoretical work in this vein, for example 
combining local-to-global reciprocity with models of network structure40-44, is an 
important direction for future research.  
 
Our findings build on existing interventions to increase public goods contributions in the 
real world that have implications for policy-makers45-47. Sign-ups among residents in 
apartment complexes to participate in a voluntary energy reduction program are higher 
when the sign-up sheet is publicly observable48. The more tax evaders are aware that their 
neighbours know of their delinquency, the higher their compliance with tax repayments14. 
And telling voters that it is possible that they will receive a follow-up phone call to check 
on their participation increases voter turnout49. Our laboratory experiments provide 
tightly controlled evidence of the mechanism underpinning these field experiment results: 
when we are provided with information about other people’s cooperative actions, we will 
reward them for their contributions to our community and to the world at large.  
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Figure 1. The experimental setup consisted of a series of “global” and “local” 
interactions. a,b In each round, participants first took part in a global interaction stage 
and then in a pairwise local interaction stage. a In the global stage, groups of on average 
39 participants (min = 17, max = 60, sd = 10.28, N = 646) played 20 rounds of the Public 
Goods Game (PGG). In each round, participants were endowed with 20 MUs: they chose 
how many of these MUs to contribute to a common pool and how many to keep for 
themselves. The contributed units were doubled and split equally among all group 
members. b In the pairwise interaction stage, participants were connected to two other 
group members on a ring-structured network (in experiment 1; for differences to 
experiment 2, see SI Section 1). In each round, participants played a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) with each neighbour: they could choose to cooperate by paying 6 units to give 18 
units to their neighbours; or defect by doing nothing. Thus mutual cooperation yielded a 
benefit of 12 for both, unilateral cooperation cost cooperators 6 units while providing 
defectors with 18 units, and mutual defection did not alter the payoff of either participant. 
c,d The control and treatment conditions differed in what participants could observe 
about their neighbours. c In the control condition, participants were not told how many 
MUs their neighbours contributed in the PGG stage. d In the treatment condition, 
conversely, participants were informed of their neighbours’ contributions in the PGG 
while making their pairwise decisions in the PD.  
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Figure 2. Contributions in the PGG were maintained when participants knew their 
neighbours’ previous PGG contributions during the pairwise PD stage. a PGG 
contributions were maintained at high levels in the treatment condition when participants 
were informed of their neighbours’ previous PGG contributions. Conversely, in the 
control condition, the level of contributions in the group cooperation stage decreased 
quickly over time. b In the pairwise stage, the level of cooperation did not differ between 
the control and treatment conditions, but the ways in which the pairwise PDs were used 
differed substantially (see Figure 3). (Upper and lower bounds are +/- robust standard 
errors from the mean clustered on session.) 
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Figure 3. Who gets cooperated with more, or less, in the pairwise PD stage? a 
Participants in the treatment condition received less cooperation if they had contributed 
less than their neighbour, compared to the control group. However, participants did not 
receive more cooperation than in the control if they contributed at least as much as their 
neighbour. Thus, local-to-global reciprocity was enacted in local interactions by 
withholding cooperation from defectors. b Participants in the treatment condition respond 
to their neighbours’ decision to cooperate or defect in the pairwise cooperation stage: 
when both neighbours withheld cooperation from participants who contributed less in the 
PGG than their neighbours, participants increased their contributions in the PGG in the 
subsequent round. Conversely, local-to-global reciprocity was buttressing against the 
temptation to defect: the more PD cooperation high-contributing participants received 
from their neighbours, the less they decreased their contributions. (Error bars represent 
robust standard errors clustered on session.) 
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Figure 4. “Local-to-global” reciprocity is invariant to the size of the group. a We 
take advantage of random variation across sessions in the number of participants: the size 
of the group does not have an effect on the level of contributions in the final round of the 
game in the treatment condition. Indeed, a threefold increase in group size does not affect 
contributions when “local-to-global” reciprocity is possible. b In a second experiment 
(see SI Section 1), we recruited 1,000 participants to play the same large-scale PGG over 
10 rounds. Participants in treatment, where “local-to-global” reciprocity with the PD 
partner was possible, made stable PGG contributions, while participants in control 
decreased their contributions over time. (Upper and lower bounds are +/- robust standard 
errors clustered on double-pairs; see SI Section 2 for statistical details.) 
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1. Methods 
1.1 Data collection 
We recruited U.S. participants for both experiments from the online labour market 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is an online market place in which employers 
can pay users for completing short tasks – usually referred to as Human Intelligence 
Tasks (HITs) – for a relatively small pay (generally about $1.00 for 10 minutes of work).  
 
AMT has been shown to be more diverse and more nationally representative than the 
typical college student sample at major research universities (1-3). Workers who have 
been recruited on AMT receive a baseline payment and can also be paid a bonus 
depending on their performance in the task. This setup lends itself well to adopt 
incentivised economic experiments: the baseline payment acts as the ‘show-up’ fee and 
the bonus payment may derive from the workers’ behaviour in the economic game and/or 
other tasks throughout the experiment. 
 
There may, of course, exist potential issues on AMT that would not occur in a traditional 
laboratory setting. For instance, running an experiment online involves giving up some 
control over subjects, since they cannot be monitored, as is usually the case in 
laboratories. That is, it cannot be ruled out that more than a single person is taking part in 
the experiment or that one person is participating more than once in the experiment 
(although AMT has put extensive measures into place to avoid this from happening; in 
addition, we have also implemented ways to carefully screen out any possible re-takers). 
Finally, the participating subject sample, albeit more diverse and representative than the 
average college students sample, is biased towards those who participate in online labour 
markets in the first place. To address these possible concerns, numerous studies have 
been carried out to validate results collected using AMT (2-4).  
 
Our experiments (described in detail below) were implemented using the interactive 
experimental platform SoPHIE (Software Platform for Human Interaction Experiments), 
which is freely available and fully customisable at www.sophielabs.net. (5) 
 
In experiment 1, we recruited a total of 646 participants across 16 sessions. Each session 
lasted for approximately 35-40 minutes. All participants who completed the experiment 
earned a $3.00 show-up fee and had the opportunity to earn an additional “bonus” 
payment depending on their and others’ decisions in the public goods game and the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Average earnings from the game including bonus were $4.34.  
 
In experiment 2, a total of 1,352 participants were recruited across 15 sessions. Each 
session lasted for approximately 15-20 minutes. All participants who completed the 
experiment earned a $1.00 show-up and could earn a “bonus” payment depending on 
their decisions and those of other participants in the experiment. Average earnings from 
the game including bonus were $1.34. 
 
All experiments were approved by Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects in Research. 
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1.2 Experimental design 
1.2.1 Experiment 1 
 
Participants on AMT joined the experiment by responding to our ‘HIT’ posted on the 
AMT website, and being redirected to our external website where the game was hosted. 
They then received instructions on the experimental game and had to pass a 
comprehension quiz about the rules of the game (see Section 3.1 for screenshots of 
instructions and comprehension questions). Participants were not allowed to continue 
unless they answered all three comprehension questions correctly. Participants were then 
asked to wait up to 10 minutes for other participants to arrive before the experiment 
began; once the experiment did begin, all participants started at the same time. A 
countdown was displayed on their screen for the last three minutes and an audio feedback 
was played informing them about the remaining time until the experiment would start. 
Participants who did not respond within 40 seconds after the start of the experiment could 
not participate in the experiment. All participants were informed upfront that their 
presence was mandatory to be eligible to take part in this study. AMT workers who had 
taken part in a previous session of this experiment were not allowed to participate again. 
 
The experiment was conducted one session at a time. For each session, we aimed to 
maximise the number of participants. The average group size was 39 participants (min = 
17, max = 60, sd = 10.28). We launched our experiment only during business hours (9am 
– 5pm Eastern Standard Time) on weekdays for every session. All participants were 
assigned to the same condition during a single session. We randomized the order of 
treatment and control conditions across sessions (8 treatment and 8 control) prior to the 
start of the experiment.  
 
All participants who were eligible to play (i.e., finished the instructions and the quiz in 
the allotted time) were arranged in a circular network so that every participant had 
exactly two neighbours (see Figure 1 of the main text). The network structure did not 
change over the course of the experiment, except as noted below.  
 
Prior to the beginning of the actual game, all participants took part in a practice round. 
The practice round was played with two neighbours simulated by a computer, which 
participants were informed about. The practice round took place simultaneously for all 
participants to ensure that all participants were paying attention and were ready for the 
actual game. (See Section 3 for screenshots of the practice rounds.) During the practice 
round, all times to reach a decision were doubled, from 20 seconds to 40 seconds, to ease 
familiarisation with the setup.  
 
After the practice round, the real game began with participants interacting with their two 
neighbours. Due to a technical error, in all sessions neighbours were randomly reassigned 
after round 1 (but were not informed of this reshuffling). We believe this error is unlikely 
to have had any long-lasting consequences for our participants; and whatever 
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consequences it might have had would have worked against our treatment effect, by 
undermining the power of local-to-global reciprocity after the first round.  
 
From the second round onwards, a participant’s neighbours stayed the same as long as 
neither the participant nor her neighbours dropped out of the game (participant dropouts 
are a common problem in online studies, unlike in the physical lab, and the solution we 
take here is standard procedure, see Ref. (6, 7)). Dropouts were eliminated from the 
circular network and the dropouts’ former neighbours were connected. Participants were 
not told if their neighbour dropped out to avoid a ‘restart’ effect which has been observed 
in repeated games (8, 9). Participants were told to pay full attention and to avoid 
dropping out, or else their payoff—show-up fee and bonus—would be zero.  
 
Since dropouts did occur, one might worry about potential selection effects. Most 
importantly, there was no difference between the treatment and control in dropout rate 
(logistic regression using treatment dummy to predict probability of dropout, standard 
errors clustered on session, p = 0.752) or average group size (t-test of group size between 
conditions using a single indicator variable per condition, p = 0.690). Thus, differences in 
behaviour between the treatment and control cannot be attributed to dropouts. 
Furthermore, we did not find evidence that the behaviour of dropouts was systematically 
different from non-dropouts: there was no statistical difference in contributions between 
dropouts and non-dropouts (linear regression using dropout dummy to predict 
contributions clustered on session, p = 0.144), and contribution amount did not predict 
the probability of dropping out (logistic regression using contributions to predict 
likelihood of dropout clustered on session, p = 0.121). Unlike in our second experiment 
(see details below), all of our statistical analyses include non-dropouts and dropouts alike, 
because the game continued even if a participant dropped out; no participants were 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
The experiment consisted of a series of 20 rounds. Participants were not told how many 
rounds they would be playing to avoid potential last-round effects and backwards 
induction (as in Ref. (10)). Each round was comprised of a public goods game (PGG; 
stage 1) with all participants in the session contributing to a shared pool, followed by 
pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemmas (PDs; stage 2) between the direct neighbours in the 
circular network.  
 
In stage 1, participants chose a contribution of between 0 and 20 units in the PGG. All 
contributions were doubled and every participant in the session received an equal share 
from the public good. After making their PGG contribution decision, participants in both 
conditions learned their individual payoff from the PGG. In the treatment condition, the 
participants were also informed of their neighbours’ contributions to the PGG, while 
participants in the control condition received no additional information.  
 
Across both conditions, participants in stage 2 then played two pairwise PDs with their 
two neighbours. They could choose between cooperation (paying a cost of 6 units to 
provide the neighbour with a benefit of 18 units) and defection (paying no cost and 
providing no benefit). Once all participants had made their choice, in both conditions the 
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PD actions of the participant’s two neighbours were displayed and the participant’s 
payoffs in the current round were summarised. (See Section 3 for instructions and 
screenshots of the experiment.) 
1.2.2 Experiment 2 
 
Participants on AMT joined the experiment by accepting our AMT ‘HIT’. They read the 
instructions (see screenshots in Section 3.2) and had to pass several comprehension 
questions. Participants waited in an online ‘waiting room’ for up to 5 minutes for three 
other participants to arrive. As soon as four participants were ready, the game began 
immediately. There was no practice round; however, the time to reach a decision in each 
stage was 10 seconds longer in the first round of the experiment than in later rounds. 
 
The two-stage economic game in the second experiment was similar in many ways to one 
in the first experiment: participants first made a decision in a group contribution stage—
the large-scale repeated PGG—and then in a pairwise cooperation stage—a repeated PD. 
However, there were also several differences between the two experiments. First, while 
participants in the first experiment interacted with two players in the PD stage, every 
participant in experiment 2 played a repeated PD with only one other participant.  
 
Furthermore, participants in this experiment were no longer recruited all at the same time; 
they were instead recruited in batches of 4 participants, which formed two pairs who 
played the game at the same time. (We refer to these two simultaneously playing pairs of 
players as “double pairs.”) We required two pairs of participants playing the game 
simultaneously due to a change to the control condition. Participants in the control in 
experiment 1 were not informed about anyone’s PGG contributions during the PD stage, 
while participants in the treatment condition always knew the PGG contributions of two 
other players (those with whom they also played the PD). We argued in experiment 1 that 
observing the PGG contributions of one’s PD partners is crucial to sustaining 
contributions; however, an alternative “social norm” explanation could be that seeing 
anyone else’s PGG contributions is sufficient to maintain contributions (i.e., without 
playing a repeated PD with that same person). We rule out this “social norm” possibility 
with a new control condition in experiment 2.  
 
Participants in the control condition in experiment 2 saw the PGG contributions of 
another player who was part of the larger PGG. This player was not the same participant 
with whom they interacted in the PD stage of the game. They saw instead the 
contributions of one of the players of the pair that played the game simultaneously, and 
played a repeated PD with a participant whose contributions they did not see. In the 
treatment condition, conversely, participants continued to observe the contributions of the 
player with whom they also played the PD game. Thus, in both conditions, participants 
saw someone’s PGG contributions: any difference we observe between control and 
treatment thus cannot be attributed to a “social norm” of others’ contribution, but is 
caused by interacting directly with the person whose contributions were observable. 
 
(While we required four participants to be playing the game at the same time in the 
control, we only needed two players at the same time in the treatment condition. To avoid 
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any differences in decision times or dropout rates between conditions, however, 
participants in the treatment condition also played the game in batches of 4 participants. 
Note though that each pair of players played their game independently and was not aware 
of another pair that played simultaneously.) 
 
Finally, participants in the second experiment did not learn about their payoff from the 
PGG. Because all 1,000 participants were not online simultaneously, it was not possible 
to calculate the payoff of each round of the PGG in real time. Participants were told that 
their earnings from the PGG would be calculated at the end of the study. Thus, 
participants in neither condition learned whether or not overall levels of contributions in 
the large group were stable, decreasing, or increasing. The lack of feedback from the 
PGG implies that conditionally cooperative players (11) would not be able to respond to 
the changes in contributions by the entire group. However, they would still be able to 
observe, and respond to, the PGG contributions of the player whose contributions they 
saw during the PD stage. Furthermore, although the lack of PGG feedback could 
potentially affect individuals’ contribution behaviour, this lack of feedback is the same 
across both conditions and it could thus not drive any difference between conditions. 
 
The experiment consisted of a series of 10 rounds of the two-stage economic game (as 
described in more detail above for experiment 1). To avoid end-game effects, participants 
were not told how many rounds would be played (e.g. see (7)). In stage 1, participants 
could contribute between 0 and 20 units in the PGG. In stage 2, participants played a PD 
with another player who remained the same throughout the game: each person could 
choose to cooperate (paying 12 units to increase the other player’s payoff by 36 units) or 
defect (no cost or benefit to either party) with the other player. 
 
The experiment was conducted one session at a time. For each session, we recruited as 
many as 200 participants per session, and recruitment continued until we had 500 
participants per condition (total N = 1,000) who had completed the game. To keep with 
random assignment, the order of conditions was alternated across sessions. All 
participants were assigned to the same condition for every session. In total, we conducted 
15 sessions (7 control, 8 treatment) and recruited 1,352 participants, of which 26% of 
groups did not complete the game due to one or more dropout. 
 
Dropouts in the second experiment were handled differently than in the first experiment. 
While in experiment 1 a participant who dropped out was simply “replaced” by his or her 
two nearest neighbours joining the cyclic network and playing the remainder of the game 
together, this was not possible in experiment 2, as there were only 4 participants in the 
same stage of the game at the same time. Thus, if one participant dropped out (e.g., by 
closing his or her Internet browser, or losing Internet connection), the remaining three 
participants, who were part of the two pairs playing the game simultaneously, could not 
continue. Although those participants could not finish the game, they were compensated 
for their time by earning the $1.00 show-up fee and a bonus of $0.30. 
 
Across both conditions, 352 participants (26%) did not complete the game. There was no 
significant difference in the number of dropout groups between conditions (logistic 
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regression using treatment dummy to predict probability of dropout at the “double pairs” 
level, with robust standard errors, p = 0.714). Neither did levels of contributions nor rates 
of pairwise cooperation predict the probability of dropping out (logistic regression to 
predict probability of dropout, clustered on double pair; using contribution: p = 0.473; 
using cooperation: p = 0.378). 
 
Our main analysis focuses on the 1,000 participants (500 per condition) who completed 
all 10 rounds of the game. However, we find qualitative similar results when dropout 
groups are included (see Table S13). 
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2. Statistical details 
In experiment 1, all games lasted 20 rounds. In each round of the game, participants had 
to make three choices. First, how many units they wanted to contribute to a group-wide 
PGG. Contributions in the PGG are measured on a continuous scale (i.e., integers from 0 
to 20 where 0 is full defection and 20 is full cooperation). Then, they made two 
simultaneous decisions in the PD stage: whether or not to cooperate with each of their 
two neighbours. Cooperation in the PD is a binary measure (i.e., 1=cooperation, 
0=defection).  
 
In experiment 2, all games lasted 10 rounds. In each round of the game, participants made 
two choices: how many units (between 0 and 20) to contribute in a large-scale PGG and 
whether or not to cooperate with another participant in the PD.  
 
Unless otherwise indicated, we used linear regression models with robust standard errors 
clustered on session to account for the fact that decisions of players within a given 
session are not independent. 
 
2.1 Group contributions	
We first asked the basic question of how contributions in the group cooperation stage 
differed between conditions. We predicted contributions to the public good in the control 
condition to be less than in the treatment condition. This difference would grow as time 
passed: participants would maintain stable contributions in the treatment condition, while 
contributions in the control condition would decrease over time. The dependent variable 
in our analyses was the amount of units contributed per round. The independent variables 
were a dummy for the control condition (1=control, 0=treatment) and current round 
number. 
 
As predicted, we found that participants contributed less on average in the control 
condition than in the treatment condition, both in the first round (coeff = -1.491, p = 
0.018, Table S1 col. 1) and averaged over all rounds (coeff = -5.727, p < 0.001, Table S1 
col. 2). Furthermore, this difference in contributions emerged over time (interaction 
between round and control dummy, coeff = -0.294, p < 0.001, Table S2 col. 3): we 
observed a significant decrease in contribution over time in the control (coeff = -0.345, p 
< 0.001, Table S2 col. 1), but not in the treatment (coeff = -0.051, p = 0.098, Table S2 
col. 2).  
 
Figure S1 shows the distribution of contributions in the control and treatment conditions 
across all sessions. 
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Table S1: Linear regression model estimating the effect of treatment on contributions in 
the group cooperation stage. The treatment condition is taken as baseline. Standard errors 
clustered on session. 
 
 First round All rounds 
1=Control -1.491 -5.727 
 (0.561)* (0.633)*** 
Constant 14.231 14.484 
 (0.413)*** (0.409)*** 
R2 0.01 0.12 
N 646 11,552 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Table S2: Linear regression model estimating the effect of round and experimental 
condition on contributions in the group cooperation stage. In column 3, the treatment 
condition is taken as baseline. Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
Round -0.345 -0.051 -0.051 
 (0.026)*** (0.027) (0.026) 
1=Control   -2.763 
   (0.546)*** 
1=Control X round   -0.294 
   (0.036)*** 
Constant 12.240 15.003 15.003 
 (0.460)*** (0.328)*** (0.317)*** 
R2 0.06 0.00 0.15 
N 5,981 5,571 11,552 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure S1. The distribution of the contributions between the control and treatment 
conditions, pooled across all sessions in experiment 1. 
 
2.2 Pairwise cooperation	
We then turned to the question of how participants interacted in the pairwise cooperation 
stage. Participants could choose to cooperate or defect with each of their neighbours 
(They did not have to make the same choices for both.)  
 
Here, our unit of observation was the PD cooperation decision (2 observations per 
participant per round). The independent variable was PD choice (0=defect, 1=cooperate). 
The dependent variables were a dummy for the control condition (1=control, 
0=treatment) and current round number. We use linear regression (despite having a 
binary DV) in order to have more easily interpretable coefficients; however, we note that 
using logistic regression instead does not qualitatively change any outcomes.  
 
Although we found that there was significantly more cooperation in the control condition 
than the treatment in period 1 (coeff = 0.075, p < 0.001, Table S3 col. 1), there was no 
significant difference when considering all rounds (coeff = 0.031, p = 0.342, Table S3 
col. 2). Furthermore, there was no significant difference between conditions in how 
cooperation changed over time (interaction between round number and control dummy, 
coeff = -0.001, p = 0.492, Table S4 col. 3): cooperation declined very slightly over time 
in both the control condition (coeff = -0.005, p = 0.016, Table S4 col. 1) and treatment 
condition (coeff = -0.004, p = 0.006, Table S4 col. 2), at a modest rate of on average 
0.4% per round.  
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Table S3: Linear regression model estimating the effect of treatment on levels of 
cooperation in the pairwise cooperation stage. The treatment condition is taken as 
baseline. Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 First round All rounds 
1=Control 0.075 0.031 
 (0.015)*** (0.032) 
Constant 0.615 0.579 
 (0.012)*** (0.028)*** 
R2 0.01 0.00 
N 1,292 23,104 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Table S4: Linear regression model estimating the effect of round and experimental 
condition on PD cooperation. In column 3, the treatment condition is taken as baseline. 
Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
Round -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002)* (0.001)** (0.001)** 
1=Control   0.044 
   (0.027) 
1=Control X round   -0.001 
   (0.002) 
Constant 0.661 0.617 0.617 
 (0.012)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 11,962 11,142 23,104 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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2.3 Pairwise cooperation strategies	
While the average levels of cooperation in the PD stage did not differ between the two 
conditions, the ways in which the PD was used did differ between conditions. 
 
In the control condition, participants could not condition their behaviour in the PD on 
their neighbours’ PGG contributions, because this information was not available to them. 
Thus, we only expected participants to condition their PD behaviour on their neighbours’ 
previous cooperation (i.e. to engage in “local” reciprocity). Indeed, we found that 
participants in the control condition were substantially more likely to cooperate if their 
partner had cooperated with them in the previous round (using neighbour’s action in prior 
PD round as independent variable with 0=defect, 1=cooperate: coeff = 0.540, p < 0.001, 
Table S5 col. 1). 
 
Conversely, participants in the treatment condition were informed of their neighbours’ 
PGG contributions while making their PD decisions. They were thus able to enact local-
to-global reciprocity: they could condition their local PD cooperation with a given 
neighbour on that neighbour’s contribution to the global PGG. Indeed, participants in the 
treatment were significantly more likely to cooperate with neighbours who were high 
contributors in the PGG (using neighbour’s action in PGG immediately prior to the given 
PD as independent variable with 0=neighbour contributed less than the participant, 
1=neighbour contributed at least as much as the participant, following the definition in 
(10): coeff = 0.175, p < 0.001, Table S5 col. 2).  
 
Participants also engaged in traditional local reciprocity, cooperating more with 
neighbours who had cooperated with them in the previous PD round (coeff = 0.475, p < 
0.001, Table S5 col. 2). Furthermore, there was a synergistic interaction between local 
reciprocity and local-to-global reciprocity (interaction between neighbour’s cooperation 
dummy and neighbour’s contribution dummy, coeff = 0.168, p = 0.002; Table S5 col. 3), 
such that participants were most likely to cooperate with neighbours who both cooperated 
in the previous PD and were high contributors in the PGG. 
 
We find qualitatively similar results when we use continuous PGG contribution as the 
dependent variable in our regression models (Table S6). 
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Table S5: Linear regression model estimating the effect of a neighbour’s previous 
pairwise cooperation and her group contribution on the participant’s willingness to 
cooperate with her in the current round. Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Control Treatment Treatment 
1=Neighbour cooperated 0.540 0.475 0.356 
 (0.038)*** (0.014)*** (0.033)*** 
1=Neighbour contributed same or 
more than me 
 0.175 0.088 
 (0.021)*** (0.027)* 
1=Neighbour cooperated X 
contributed same or more 
  0.168 
  (0.035)** 
Constant 0.274 0.176 0.233 
 (0.026)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)*** 
R2 0.29 0.27 0.28 
N 11,294 10,518 10,518 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table S6: Linear regression model estimating the effect of a neighbour’s previous 
pairwise cooperation and her group contribution on the participant’s willingness to 
cooperate with her in the current round. Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Control Treatment Treatment 
1=Neighbour cooperated 0.540 0.411 0.246 
 (0.038)*** (0.017)*** (0.050)** 
1=Neighbour's PGG contribution  0.019 0.014 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
1=Neighbour cooperated X  
PGG contribution 
  0.011 
  (0.003)** 
Constant 0.274 0.067 0.124 
 (0.026)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
R2 0.29 0.31 0.32 
N 11,294 10,518 10,518 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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It is possible, however, that participants in the treatment only consulted their neighbour’s 
PGG contribution early in the game, as a way to deciding whether or not their neighbour 
was likely going to cooperate with them in the PD (rather than using local-to-global 
reciprocity to enforce PGG contribution). This alternative account suggests that after 
having played several rounds of the PD with their neighbour, they would then ignore 
their neighbours’ PGG behaviour and only pay attention to their neighbours’ last decision 
in the PD. In that case, the local-to-global effect would disappear in later rounds (the 
interaction in a similar regression to Table S5 col. 3, for later rounds only, would no 
longer be significant) because PGG behaviour would only be a diagnostic tool early in 
the game. 
 
To evaluate this alternative hypothesis, we repeat our analysis above, separately for the 
first half of the game (rounds 1 through 10) and the second half of the game (rounds 11 
through 20) in the treatment condition. Contrary to this alternative explanation, we find 
that local-to-global reciprocity is enacted in both early and later rounds: participants 
cooperate more with neighbours who have contributed at least as much as them in the 
PGG (in early rounds: coeff = 0.192, p < 0.001, Table S7 col. 1; in later rounds: coeff = 
0.150, p < 0.001, Table S7 col. 3), as well as being more likely to cooperate with 
neighbours who have cooperated with them previously (in early rounds: coeff = 0.380, p 
< 0.001, Table S7 col. 1; in later rounds: coeff = 0.568, p < 0.001, Table S7 col. 3),.  
 
In addition, in both early and later rounds, the synergy between PD cooperation and PGG 
contributions persists: participants are more likely to cooperate with neighbours who 
have cooperated with them and have also contributed at least as much as themselves in 
the PGG (interaction between neighbour’s previous PD cooperation dummy and 
neighbour’s PGG contribution; in early rounds: coeff = 0.121, p = 0.004, Table S7 col. 2; 
in later rounds: coeff = 0.203, p = 0.003, Table S7 col. 3).  
 
Thus, participants consult both their neighbour’s previous cooperation in the PD and their 
neighbour’s contribution in the PGG in deciding whether to cooperate with them, even in 
later rounds. Thus it does not seem that participants are using PGG contributions are a 
diagnostic tool for predicting their neighbours’ PD cooperation, but instead are using 
local-to-global reciprocity in the PD to enforce PGG contribution. 
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Table S7: Linear regression model estimating the effect of a neighbour’s previous 
pairwise cooperation and her group contribution on the participant’s willingness to 
cooperate with her in the current round, separate for rounds 1-10 (cols. 1 and 2) and for 
rounds 11-20 (cols. 3 and 4). Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Rounds 1-10 Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 Rounds 11-20 
1=Neighbour_cooperated 0.380 0.292 0.568 0.422 
 (0.013)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.049)*** 
1=Neighbour contributed 
same or more than me 
0.192 0.121 0.150 0.053 
(0.025)*** (0.030)** (0.022)*** (0.025) 
1=Neighbour cooperated X 
contributed same or more 
 0.127  0.203 
 (0.030)**  (0.045)** 
Constant 0.231 0.278 0.131 0.193 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** 
R2 0.19 0.19 0.37 0.38 
N 5,284 5,284 5,234 5,234 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
Two mechanisms could explain our results: either participants cooperated more in the PD 
with high-contributing neighbours in the PGG, or they cooperated less in the PD with 
low-contributing neighbours (or both). To find out which mechanism was at work in our 
data, we compared cooperation rates towards low and high contributors in the treatment 
condition to cooperation rates in the control condition (where the neighbour’s 
contribution was unknown).  
 
If withholding cooperation of low contributors was occurring, we would expect less PD 
cooperation with low contributors in the treatment than with unknown contributors in the 
control; and indeed, this is what we observe (regression including all PD choices from 
control and PD choices where neighbour contributed less than the participant from the 
treatment, using treatment dummy as independent variable: coeff = -0.201, p < 0.001, 
Table S8 col. 1; controlling for previous cooperation behaviour does not affect this result, 
coeff = -0.135, p < 0.001, Table S8 col. 2). If more cooperation with high contributors 
was occurring, conversely, we would expect more PD cooperation with high contributors 
in the treatment than with unknown contributors in the control; but we find no such effect 
(regression including all PD choices from control and PD choices where neighbour 
contributed as much as more than the participant from the treatment, using treatment 
dummy as independent variable: coeff = 0.037, p = 0.303, Table S9). 
 
In short, pairwise cooperation rates in the treatment condition differed towards low-
contributing neighbours relative to the control group, but not towards high contributors. 
Specifically, participants withheld cooperation from low contributors, rather than 
cooperated more with high contributors.  
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Table S8: Linear regression model estimating the effects of the treatment on a 
participant’s likelihood of cooperating in the pairwise cooperation stage with a neighbour 
who contributed less than the participant in the group cooperation stage. The baseline 
group are participants of any contribution level in the control condition. Standard errors 
clustered on session. 
 
 Neighbour contributed less Neighbour contributed less 
1=Treatment -0.201 -0.135 
 (0.026)*** (0.018)*** 
1=Neighbour 
cooperated 
 0.500 
 (0.034)*** 
Constant 0.610 0.299 
 (0.016)*** (0.024)*** 
R2 0.03 0.27 
N 15,141 14,270 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Table S9: Linear regression model estimating the effects of the treatment on a 
participant’s likelihood of cooperating in the pairwise cooperation stage with a neighbour 
who contributed the same or more than the participant in the group cooperation stage. 
The baseline group are participants of any contribution level in the control condition. 
Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Neighbour contributed  
same or more 
Neighbour contributed  
same or more 
1=Treatment 0.037 0.036 
 (0.034) (0.019) 
1=Neighbour 
cooperated 
 0.534 
 (0.023)*** 
Constant 0.610 0.278 
 (0.016)*** (0.017)*** 
R2 0.00 0.29 
N 19,925 18,836 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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2.4 Response in PGG to neighbours’ PD choices	
We observed that participants in the treatment condition were less likely to cooperate in 
the PD stage with neighbours who had contributed less than them in the PGG. They 
withheld cooperation from low contributors. Did this withholding work to elicit more 
contributions from low contributors in the future?  
 
Indeed, we found that in the treatment, the less a low contributor’s neighbours cooperated 
with her, the more she contributed in the next PGG round (change in contribution 
predicted by the number of neighbours withholding cooperation (i.e. defecting in PD): 
coeff = 1.153, p < 0.001, Table S10 col. 2). Interestingly, withholding had to be 
coordinated in order to be effective: having only one neighbour withhold cooperation did 
not increase subsequent contributions of the low contributor relative to having both 
neighbours cooperate (coeff = 0.069, p = 0.871); it was necessary to have both 
neighbours withhold cooperation in order to motivate low contributors to increase their 
contributions (0 vs. 2 withholding neighbours: coeff = 1.981, p = 0.001) (see Table S11).  
 
Importantly, this effect was unique to the treatment. In the control, having cooperation 
withheld by one or both neighbours had no effect on low-contributing participants’ 
subsequent PGG contribution (using number of withholding neighbours as independent 
variable: coeff = 0.048, p = 0.857, Table S10 col. 1; using discrete number of neighbours 
withholding: 0 vs 1 neighbour withholding: coeff = -0.038, p = 0.920; 0 vs. 2 cooperating 
withholding: coeff = 0.129, p = 0.804, Table S11 col. 1). Furthermore, when data from 
both conditions are taken together, a significant interaction between condition and the 
number of neighbours withholding cooperation demonstrated that the effect of 
withholding on future contributions was significantly larger in the treatment than the 
control (interaction between number of cooperating neighbours and treatment dummy: 
coeff = 1.105, p = 0.002, Table S10 col. 3; qualitatively the similar result as describe 
above using interaction between treatment dummy and discrete number of neighbours, 
see Table S11 col. 3). 
 
In addition to disciplining low contributors, neighbours’ behaviour in PD mechanism also 
effectively buttressed high contributors against the temptation to reduce contributions in 
the treatment condition: the more PD cooperation high contributors received from their 
neighbours, the less they reduced their contributions in the next round (coeff = 0.828, p < 
0.001, Table S12 col. 2). In the control condition, however, there was no “buttressing 
effect”: receiving more cooperation from neighbours did not protect against declining 
contributions in control (coeff = 0.253, p = 0.183, Table S12 col. 1); an observation that 
was also confirmed by a significant interaction for the treatment condition only 
(interacting number of cooperating neighbours with treatment dummy: coeff = 0.575, p = 
0.015, Table S12 col. 3). 
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Table S10: Linear regression model estimating the effect of both neighbours’ defection 
in the PD stage on change in contributions of participants who contributed less than their 
neighbours previously in the PGG stage. Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
# Neighbours withholding PD 
cooperation 
0.048 1.153 0.048 
(0.255) (0.183)*** (0.246) 
1=Treatment   -0.966 
   (0.369)* 
1=Treatment X neighbours withholding   1.105 
   (0.303)** 
Constant 1.840 0.874 1.840 
 (0.247)*** (0.291)* (0.239)*** 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.01 
N 2,586 1,663 4,249 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Table S11: Linear regression model estimating the effect of one or two neighbours’ 
defection in the PD on change in contributions of participants who contributed less than 
their neighbours previously in the PGG. Standard errors clustered on session. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
1 neighbour withheld PD cooperation -0.038 0.069 -0.038 
 (0.365) (0.411) (0.353) 
2 neighbours withheld PD cooperation 0.129 1.981 0.129 
 (0.500) (0.393)** (0.483) 
1=Treatment   -0.430 
   (0.426) 
1=Treatment X 1 neighbour withheld   0.107 
   (0.531) 
1=Treatment X 2 neighbours withheld   1.852 
   (0.614)** 
Constant 1.869 1.439 1.869 
 (0.261)*** (0.355)** (0.252)*** 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.01 
N 2,586 1,663 4,249 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table S12: Linear regression model estimating the effect of both neighbours’ 
cooperation in the PD on change in contributions of participants who contributed the 
same or more than their neighbours previously in the PGG. Standard errors clustered on 
session. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
# Neighbours cooperating in PD 0.253 0.828 0.253 
 (0.171) (0.132)*** (0.166) 
1=Treatment   0.319 
   (0.290) 
1=Treatment X neighbours cooperating   0.575 
   (0.209)* 
Constant -2.523 -2.205 -2.523 
 (0.217)*** (0.208)*** (0.209)*** 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.02 
N 3,061 3,596 6,657 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
2.5 Scalability	
2.5.1 Random variation of group size 
 
Finally, we present evidence that our “local-to-global” reciprocity is scalable across 
different sized groups. We take advantage of random variation across sessions in the 
number of participants in the PGG to illustrate this. One might worry that as groups 
become larger, local interactions between just two neighbours might be ineffective at 
stabilising contributions in the global PGG.  
 
However, we find no evidence for this: contributions in the final round of the game do 
not decline as groups become larger in the treatment condition (coeff = -0.015, p = 0.782, 
Table S13 col. 2; all regressions in this section take the group as the unit of observation, 
with one data point per group). In fact, a threefold increase in the size of the group has no 
discernible impact on PGG contributions in the treatment.  
 
In contrast, final round contributions in the control do seem to decrease as groups grow 
larger, albeit only at a marginal level of statistical significance (coeff = -0.110, p = 0.069, 
Table S13 col. 1). When data from both the control and treatment conditions are taken 
together, we correspondingly observe a positive interaction between a treatment dummy 
and group size (coeff = 0.095, p = 0.204, Table S13 col. 3), suggesting that our 
intervention if anything becomes more effective relative to the control as groups becomes 
larger, although this interaction does not achieve statistical significance (perhaps not 
surprisingly given that we have only 8 independent observations per condition and thus 
Think global, act local: Supplementary Information  
 
 
Page S20 of S37 
the statistical test has little power). Results when considering average PGG contributions 
over all rounds are qualitatively similar (Table S14). 
 
Table S13: Linear regression model estimating the effect of group size on PGG 
contributions in the final round of the game. Each session corresponds to one 
observation, and robust standard errors are used. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
Group size -0.110 -0.015 -0.110 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)* 
1=Treatment   3.521 
   (3.077) 
1=Treatment X group size   0.095 
   (0.071) 
Constant 11.125 14.646 11.125 
 (2.469)** (1.836)*** (2.469)*** 
R2 0.36 0.01 0.85 
N 8 8 16 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Table S14: Linear regression model estimating the effect of group size on PGG 
contributions averaged over all rounds of the game. Each session corresponds to one 
observation, and robust standard errors are used. 
 
 Control Treatment Both 
Group size -0.052 -0.011 -0.052 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) 
1=Treatment   -0.318 
   (2.003) 
1=Treatment X group size   0.041 
   (0.046) 
Constant 15.030 14.712 15.030 
 (1.672)*** (1.103)*** (1.672)*** 
R2 0.23 0.02 0.37 
N 8 8 16 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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2.5.2 Large-scale PGG with 1,000 players 
 
To further address the question of scalability, we ran an additional experiment with 1,000 
participants playing one large PGG. In the treatment condition, participants were able to 
see the contributions of the player with whom they also played a repeated PD after each 
round of the PGG. Conversely, in the control condition, participants were not able to see 
the contributions of their PD partner. However, each player in the control condition saw 
the contributions of another player who was simultaneously playing the same game with 
someone else (see SI Section 1 for experimental details). 
 
This design required four participants playing the game simultaneously in two pairs in the 
control condition, and the decisions between those pairs are not independent. Thus, to 
account for this interdependence, we cluster standard errors at this “double pairs” level 
(i.e., four players in two pairs playing the game simultaneously). To keep decision 
decision times and dropout rates constant between control and treatment, we also 
required that two pairs of participants played the game simultaneously in the treatment 
group and thus we also cluster on double pairs. 
 
As before, we predicted that contributions would be lower in control than treatment, and 
this difference would emerge over time. This is indeed what we found: overall levels of 
contribution were lower in control than treatment (coeff = -1.456, p = 0.005, Table S15 
col. 1). Over time, participants in the control condition decreased their contributions 
(coeff = -0.136, p < 0.001, Table S15 col. 2), while contributions remained stable in 
treatment (coeff = -0.027, p = 0.429, Table S15 col. 3). This difference was significant 
when we combined the data from both conditions (interaction between number of rounds 
and control dummy, coeff = -0.109, p = 0.017, Table S15 col. 4). 
 
Furthermore, we found qualitatively similar results when we include dropout groups in 
our analysis (Table S15 col. 5). 
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Table S15: Linear regression model estimating the effect of experimental condition and 
round on contributions in the large public goods game. Standard errors clustered on 
“double pairs” (groups of four simultaneous players). 
 
 Combined Control Treatment Interaction Interaction 
1=Control -1.456   -0.855 -0.886 
 (0.514)**   (0.504) (0.431)* 
Round  -0.136 -0.027 -0.027 -0.044 
  (0.030)*** (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
1=Control  
  X Round 
   -0.109 -0.098 
   (0.046)* (0.049)* 
Constant 11.912 11.206 12.061 12.061 12.194 
 (0.362)*** (0.361)*** (0.354)*** (0.353)*** (0.307)*** 
Dropouts 
included No No No No Yes 
R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
N 10,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 11,620 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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3. Instructions 
3.1 Experiment 1	
A red box indicates treatment only; all else was identical across conditions. 
 
Page 1: (Green box = correct answers to comprehension questions) 
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Note: The information in the red box was only available in the treatment condition. 
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Page 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
Pages 3-5 (practice round; each screenshot shows one page) 
 
 
 
 
Note: The information in the red box was only available in the treatment condition. 
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Pages 6-9 (real game, repeated 20 times; each screenshot shows one page): 
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Note: The information in the red box was only available in the treatment condition. 
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3.2 Experiment 2	
3.2.1 Control condition 
 
Page 1: (Green box = correct answers to comprehension questions) 
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Pages 2-4 (repeated 10 times; each screenshot shows one page): 
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3.2.2 Treatment condition 
 
Page 1: (Green box = correct answers to comprehension questions) 
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Pages 2-4 (repeated 10 times; each screenshot shows one page): 
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